ABSTRACT The dynamic thermal rating (DTR) system is one of most widely used state-of-the-art of smart grids owing to its proven ability to improve the existing line ratings at a fraction of the cost of most extant methods without infringing line safety requirements. However, the successful implementation of this system depends on the reliability of communication networks, especially wireless communication systems, in transmitting line rating information back to the utility company so that an appropriate line flow control can be executed. Therefore, the efficient, continuous, and secure operations of smart grids are equally affected by the reliability of the DTR and wireless communication systems. Despite this evidence, the reliability impacts of these systems on power grids are yet to be examined in a single framework. In this paper, a new model for investigating the reliability impacts of the DTR system on power grids considering the wireless communication network is proposed. The inability of the DTR system to perform, either due to its unavailability or communication failure, is taken as a function of line ratings that affect the transmission capacity and reliability of power grids. When the DTR system service is unavailable, the line rating is either reverted to the static thermal rating or estimated via the multi-linear regression (MLR) model based on information from neighboring regions. The comparison of these two models on the IEEE 24-bus reliability test system reveals that the MLR model is more beneficial in mitigating DTR and communication systems failures. This paper also explores various communication system failure scenarios and the reliability impacts of redundancy designs. The findings reveal that the communication system with moderate reliability levels yield the most benefits when the redundancy number increases from 1 to 4. Overall, the communication system significantly affects the availability of the DTR system. INDEX TERMS Dynamic thermal rating systems, power system, reliability, wireless communication network, smart grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern (and future) energy networks are equipped with a myriad of technologies to improve the robustness of their operations. Although the future evolution of current technologies is impossible to predict, chances are that such evolution will be based on the existing ones. Research on smart grids for electrical power networks, especially on topics related to demand side management [1] - [4] , dynamic thermal rating (DTR) systems [4] - [7] , energy storage [8] , [9] 
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vehicles [10] , [11] , renewable energy sources and their integration into power grids [12] , [13] , has received much attention. Along with the recent developments in the Internet of Things and Industry 4.0 concepts, grids are expected to become heavily integrated with information and communications technologies, especially wireless communications, to enable interactions amongst devices and to improve the automation, activity and efficiency of these technologies. The wireless communication system of smart grids plays a crucial role in the sensing and measurement of various power system components. Under normal operating conditions, the obtained information and control signals are exchanged to continuously manage the grids and to ensure highly reliable and secure operations. Therefore, apart from the electrical components that are commonly managed and studied by network operators, the management of future smart grids must also consider those communication networks filled with various technologies, standards and protocols.
Wireless communication networks need to be resilient in a way that the failure of some of their components should only have minimal effects on electrical grids. In other words, these electrical grids must be able to maintain a targeted reliability level for each segment of their operations, including generation, transmission and distribution, in case of planned communication network outages. To address this problem, various wireless network reliability models have been proposed [14] - [16] , the cybersecurity and reliability aspects of the power system communication infrastructure (i.e., PMUs and SCADA) have been examined [17] - [19] and the reliability of the wide area measurement system of smart grids have been explored [20] - [22] . However, to the best of the authors' knowledge, a reliability analysis of wireless communication networks to support the application of the DTR system, which is implemented as a strategy for increasing the power transmission capacity of existing networks, is yet to be conducted. This paper focuses on the DTR system given its effectiveness and wide usage in enhancing the reliability of power systems.
Unlike the conventional static thermal rating (STR) method, the DTR system integrates sensors into the transmission network to pick up information about critical weather conditions (i.e. wind speed, solar radiation, ambient temperature and incident wind angle) as identified by IEEE 738 close to the overhead transmission lines [23] and then uses these parameters to calculate the line ratings. By contrast, STR merely assumes a set of conservative values for these weather conditions. As the conditions are most of the time much more desirable, the STR underestimates the line ratings by as much as 10% to 30% or even by 50% in windy areas [7] , [24] , [25] . The DTR system also has a shorter lead time and is much cheaper compared with most methods used for increasing line ratings [5] . Another main reason for the rise in popularity of the DTR system is many advanced power utility companies are currently facing challenges in expanding their networks given the strict land and space limitations [5] . Despite the widespread usage of this system and its many proven benefits in improving line ratings, the reliability of communication networks has been largely ignored in previous DTR system research [5] , [26] , [27] . It is important that this point be highlighted as the successful application of the DTR system depends not only on its robust operations but also on the reliability of its communication network in transmitting line rating signals.
To fill this gap, this paper presents a joint reliability analysis of the DTR system and its wireless communication network. The hierarchical structure network comprises the DTR system, the neighbourhood-area network (NAN) and the wide-area network (WAN). In the studied model, each transmission line is equipped with a DTR system that comprises all necessary sensors, software and communication devices. To improve the management of the communication load [28] , each DTR system is grouped into an area and sends the collected needed information for calculating line ratings to their respective NAN gateways. Wireless technologies, such as IEEE 802.11, can be used as communication standards for NANs. Afterwards, all the information is forwarded by the NAN gateways to a data aggregator unit (DAU) and then to a data management centre (DMC) where the line ratings are determined. All NANs are connected by WAN, in which wireless technologies, such as 3G/4G/5G cellular networks, can be used.
A reliability analysis of smart grid communication networks can quantify the availability of connections from DTR systems to NAN gateways, DAU and DMC. Given their availability, network operators can assess the risk resulting from the loss of line rating potential in case of communication breakdowns. This type of information can be used as a basis for optimising line rating management policies. The findings of this work indicate that communication network device failures significantly influence the power transmission capacity. The contributions of this paper are summarised as follows:
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the proposed methodology. Section III presents the results and discussion. Section IV highlights the research challenges. Section V concludes the paper.
II. METHODOLOGY
The reliability impacts of the DTR system on smart grids are assessed whilst considering the wireless communication network by using the sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) method [29] . This method integrates the modified IEEE 24-bus reliability test system (RTS), the DTR system model, the wireless communication network model and the risk model, all of which are explained in detail in the following sections.
A. RTS
A reliability analysis of the DTR system considering its wireless communication network is performed on the IEEE 24-bus RTS [30] , which has an original generating capacity and load demand of 3405 MW and 2850 MW, respectively. These values are increased twice their original amount in order to utilise the transmission network up to its maximum capacity and to highlight the uprating benefit of the DTR system. The RTS is also modified and separated into five areas of the communication network (i.e., NANs A to E) as shown in Fig. 1 , with each area being serviced by a NAN gateway.
In the RTS, those lines that share a common tower or path (indicated by a ring surrounding a line) are defined as single transmission corridors. All transmission corridors are several tens of kilometres long and span across multiple weather regions. The segment of corridors in a weather region is referred to as a 'section' whilst the size of these regions is considered to be 10 km. To achieve a realistic simulation of the real geographical distance of the RTS, the weather data of each transmission corridor from within the same area (A to E) are sourced from a 100-km-radius location on the British Atmospheric Data Center (BADC) map. Each area has its own sourcing location and the distance between the boundaries of these sourcing locations is 20 km. The weather data are sourced from the BADC archive for every hour in the past 20 years from 1996 to 2016 [31] .
B. WEATHER DATA MODEL
The probabilistic technique is widely known to be more useful than the deterministic method in analysing the reliability of power systems [29] . Following the SMC simulation performed in this paper, the collected historical weather data are fitted into an auto-regressive moving-average (ARMA) model, which is used to generate the hourly weather values to be used in the SMC simulation for all transmission corridors. The ARMA model is especially designed for fitting timeseries values that propagate over time similar to the collected weather data [32] . This model also incorporates historical simulated values and random coefficients in its framework to randomly simulate the weather value whilst retaining their historical patterns [32] . These features are crucial given that future weather values are unlikely to repeat their exact historical values whereas their propagation patterns are retained most of the time. The part of the ARMA model that comprises the historical simulated values is used for modelling the pattern whereas the random coefficients are used to model the likelihood of retaining this pattern.
With these features, a wide range of weather values can be simulated for an unlimited number of times so that the weather values used in the SMC simulation are not confined to only the collected historical data. Therefore, the SMC simulation that uses the ARMA-simulated weather value is probabilistic in nature instead of deterministic as given by the version that only uses the collected historical weather data. In the latter version of the SMC, the weather value is fixed at every iteration and is therefore no longer truly probabilistic. The ability to simulate unlimited weather values is also important given that the required number of iterations for the SMC simulation to converge cannot be known beforehand and is dependent on its coefficient of variation that gradually reduces until reaching stability.
The ARMA models of weather data (wind speed/angle) in all regions that traverse the transmission corridors can be mathematically expressed as (1) [32] , [33] y t = α 1 y t−1 + α 2 y t−2 +· · ·+α n y + e t −β 1 e t−1 − β 2 e t−2 −· · · − β m e t−m , (1) where α i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and β j (j = 1, 2, . . . , m) are the auto-regressive and moving-average constants, respectively, and e t is the normal white noise coefficient with a zero mean and variance of σ 2 (i.e. e t is normally and independently distributed e t ∈ NID 0, σ 2 ). (1) shows that the value y t in future time t from a sample containing all y is dependent on its past observed values y t−i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and past random coefficient e t−j (j = 1, 2, . . . , m). Meanwhile, y t denotes the weather value. The random sampling of e t accounts for the probabilistic changes in wind speed/angle.
During the simulation of ARMA models, the correlations amongst the historical weather data in all regions are retained and considered. The univariate (single variable) normal distributions of all original ARMA models are then combined to produce the following multivariate normal distribution (2) [34] :
where p is the number of ARMA model, µ is the mean random value of all models in vector form (in this case, µ is also a zero vector due to e t ∈ NID 0, σ 2 ) and is VOLUME 7, 2019 the covariance matrix of all models through which the e t of all ARMA models are sampled concurrently based on their correlations. Equation (2) produces a vector of correlated random white noise values, which number is equal to the number of ARMA models. By using (1) and (2) together, the simulated weather values for every hour mimic the actual correlations in the collected historical weather data.
C. DTR SYSTEM MODEL
Given that each transmission corridor spans across n weather regions, the DTR system of a corridor also comprises an n number of monitoring stations that are connected to the DTR system control unit through a wireless antenna (see section II.D for the communication network modelling). The weather conditions in each region are reasonably stable and do not fluctuate. Given that the air temperature over a very large area is kept the same, the differences amongst regions do not need to be identified and can be merely obtained from the local meteorological centre. According to [35] , the solar radiation angle and intensity have a much weaker impact on the line ratings compared with wind speed and wind angle; therefore, the assumptions given in IEEE 738 can be used. After considering these settings and for the purpose of simplicity, each monitoring station is assumed to consist of only wind speed and wind angle sensors. The model of the DTR system described above is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The failure and repair rates of each sensor are considered as 3/year and 273/year, respectively [25] . 
Given that the availability (A) of any device is determined as follows based on its mean-up and down time (3):
the availability of the DTR system on any transmission corridor can be expressed as (4) (Fig. 2 )
where A DTR is the availability of the DTR system whilst A WS i and A WA i are the availabilities of the i wind speed and wind angle sensors, respectively.
When all the sensors and the communication link between the monitoring stations and the DTR system control unit are functioning, the values of wind speed/angle are considered available and equal to the simulated weather values given by the fitted ARMA models. Otherwise, when either one of the sensors or the communication link is broken, the weather values in the affected regions are considered lost and need to be estimated.
Two weather estimation policies are considered in this paper. In the first policy (Policy 1), the weather data are reverted to conservative values. In other words, the STR is assumed for the line ratings. This policy has two downside risks. The first risk is that the estimated line ratings are much lower than the actual values and can lead to the underutilisation of line capacity and to partial load demand losses. The second and much more severe risk is that the estimated line ratings may be higher than the actual values. Under this condition, the line is operated beyond its maximum design temperature, which can lead to line over-sagging [24] and rapid line ageing [6] , [7] . To avoid these risks, the line protection system is triggered to trip the affected line, which in turn will result in the total transmission pathway and load demand losses.
In the second policy (Policy2), the weather data are estimated by using the multi-linear regression (MLR) model [25] proposed by one of the authors of this paper. This model estimates the weather data of non-functional sensors by using highly correlated weather data from the sensors in neighbouring regions. Selecting correlation thresholds of at least 90% and 95% for qualifying the regions can ensure an accurate estimation of the missing wind angle and wind speed values, respectively. A low threshold is set for qualifying the regions during the estimation of wind angle given that the correlation of historical wind angles is much lower than the wind speed. Therefore, a low qualifying threshold should also be used to obtain a sufficient number of regions (at least one) for estimating the missing wind angles of the non-functional sensors. These requirements are considered in this paper when performing MLR. The estimated weather data are then used to calculate the line ratings, which, in turn, are compared with the actual ratings. The estimation errors are only +0.6% and +5.23% at most when all and some of the sensors, respectively, in the qualified regions are functioning. To ensure a safe line operation, the estimated ratings are reduced by 1% and 6%; these percentages are obtained by rounding off the estimation errors. A similar approach is adopted in this paper when implementing the MLR model. This model generally takes the following form (5a):
where m denotes the missing wind speed/angle values of a region, (x 1 , x 2 , . . . ,x n ) are the available wind speed/angle data in those regions that are used to predict m, c is the regression coefficient that is obtained by solving the simplified parallel least squared estimation equations in (5b), as shown at the bottom of the next page, [25] and k is the number of qualified weather regions.
Depending on the selected policy, the weather values in each line section are used to calculate the ratings as follows based on IEEE 738 (6) [23] :
where q c is the convection heat loss that is calculated as a function of the conductor temperature θ • C, ambient temperature T a , wind speed v w and incident wind angle to the conductor ϕ, q r is the radiated heat loss calculated as a function of θ and T a , q s is the solar radiation heat gain and I 2 R(θ ) is the joule heat gain resulting from line conductivity. In I 2 R (θ) , I denotes the line loading in unit ampere and R(θ ) is the conductor resistance as a function of θ . From (6), the final rating of a transmission corridor is determined as the minimum rating of all its sections. 
D. WIRELESS COMMUNICATION SYSTEM MODEL
The wireless communication model proposed for the DTR system is illustrated in Fig. 3 . As can be seen in this figure, several sensors are placed along the transmission corridors to collect local weather data. A detailed study of the optimum number of sensors is presented in [24] , but this topic is outside the scope of this paper. All collected information is then sent to the control unit of the DTR system through the DTR system communication link (DCOMS) before being forwarded to the NAN gateway. The NAN gateways collect the data from all DTR systems within their respective areas before forwarding them to the DAU to form a WAN. The DMC eventually processes all the data and determines the line ratings according to (6) . Through this process, the network operators gain visibility of the transmission network and can adjust the line ratings to guarantee optimum network operations. The availability of DCOMS, NAN and WAN are determined by examining their dependence diagrams as shown in Fig. 4 [36] , which also reveals the reliability contribution of each element. Those elements that are connected in series must be functional in order for the system to operate normally. Meanwhile, only one of those elements that are connected in parallel is needed to ensure a normal system operation. Based on Fig. 4 and (3) , the availability of DCOMS, NAN and WAN are computed as (7), (8) and (9), respectively:
×A Software × A Adaptor and (8)
The reliability of the entire wireless communication network, A CN , can be formulated as (10)
(7) to (9) require a statistical analysis of the extensive records of up and downtime elements to ensure the accuracy of the calculated availabilities. However, these data are generally difficult to find. In this case, for the purpose of simplicity, this paper only considers the reliability of the NAN gateway in the simulation given that the availability of the entire communication network is equally affected by DCOMS, NAN and WAN as shown in (10) . Given that no reliability data for the NAN gateway are publicly available, various availability values are explored in this paper. All communication bandwidths and technologies are considered suitable, sufficient and unable to affect the integrity of the data transfer. (7) to (10) can be used when the missing reliability data of the elements become available in the future. Although they will undoubtedly change the numerical values used in the reliability analysis, the methodology and models presented in this paper can still be applied in the reliability analysis of smart grid wireless communication networks.
E. RISK MODEL
When failures occur on either the DTR or communication systems, the information on actual line ratings cannot be determined. Therefore, the affected lines are forced to operate with estimated ratings based on either Policy 1 or 2. Depending on the statuses of the DTR and communication systems, the risk of losing the uprating capability of the DTR system can be formulated as (11)
where f DCOPF (P l ) is the direct-current optimal power flow (DCOPF) function that aims to minimise the load loss of the RTS by optimising the power flows [37] . The DCOPF is chosen over the alternating-current OPF because only the active power constraint is modified by the DTR system. The active power constraint is more important than the reactive power in the long-term power system reliability assessment. , and minimum, PG min i , capacities, G is the set of all generators, LC is the load curtailment of the maximum power demanded PD, LB is the set of all load buses, GSF l,i is the generation shift factor of line l to generator i and L is the set of all transmission lines. In the above DCOPF, (11a) describes the load and generation balance requirement whilst (11b) and (11c) describe the generation and load curtailment constraints, respectively. In (11d), the transmission line flow is modelled and limited by the valueP l , whilst in (11e), U denotes the uniform random number generated during the SMC simulation to sample the statuses of the DTR and communication systems. Random numbers less than 1 − (A CN × A DTR ) indicate that the reliability chain link of the DTR system and communication network is down. In this case, either Policy 1 or 2 is executed.
Equation (11) is executed at each SMC iteration. The entire amount of the calculated load curtailment is then recorded to derive the risk impact of the DTR system and its communication network on the RTS. The risk impact is defined as the expected-energy-not-supplied (EENS), which is computed as (12)
where N represents the total number of simulations.
F. SIMULATION PROCEDURE OVERVIEW
The simulation procedure that involves all the models presented earlier is illustrated in Fig. 5 . The step-by-step process is summarised as follows: 1. The ARMA models of the collected weather data for all regions are obtained and used to simulate the hourly weather values (see section II.B). the EENS index is calculated to perform a joint risk assessment of the DTR and its communication network systems. 5. Steps 1 to 4 are repeated until the coefficient of variation of the EENS is equal to or less than 5%.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS A. LINE OPERATION POLICY EFFECTS
Various risk levels (EENS) of Policy 1 and 2 are compared by using the simulation procedure described in section II.F. The results are presented in Table 1 along with the various NAN gateway availabilities at which the EENS of both policies are determined. From the Table, the EENS of Policy 1 is clearly much higher than that of Policy 2 across all levels of NAN gateway availabilities. This result can be attributed to the fact that in Policy 2, the line ratings are estimated based on the MLR model when the capability of the DTR system is lost as a result of either DTR system or NAN gateway failures. As explained in section II.C, when applying MLR, the highest line rating estimation errors from the true values are initially determined from historical data, based on which the estimated ratings are reduced during the simulation when Policy 2 is invoked. Despite its conservative approach, the EENS values of Policy 2 are consistently much lower than those of Policy 1, thereby proving that the MLR model is beneficial for the application of the DTR system under unwanted failure scenarios. The poor performance of Policy 1 may be ascribed to the conservative application of the STR during the occurrence of failures, which largely undermines the actual capacity of lines and subsequently results in the unnecessary shedding of load demands. In addition, the STR given by Policy 1 is sometimes higher than the actual line ratings. Under this condition, the line protection system will be triggered to trip the line connection and result in transmission pathway loss. Given that Policy 2 provides a much lower risk level, its effects on the variation of NAN gateway availability is explored in Fig. 6 . The resolution of the studied NAN gateway availability increases as shown in the figure. Interestingly, the EENS value monotonically increases along with a decreasing NAN gateway availability, which suggests that the RTS continuously benefits from a high NAN gateway availability. In other words, the time when the improvement of the NAN gateway availability stops benefitting the reliability of the RTS remains unclear. In most cases, improving the reliability of the NAN gateway requires design modifications to its circuitry or the application of highly advanced technologies, but these solutions are not always available. As will be explored in the following section, adding redundancy presents a simple method for reducing the effects of NAN gateway unavailability.
B. REDUNDANCY AND AVAILABILITY EFFECTS
The effect of changing the NAN gateway redundancy number is investigated and the results are presented in Figs. 7 and 8 . Specifically, Fig. 7 shows the combined effects of the level and redundancy number of gateway availability on the EENS of RTS whilst Fig. 8 is derived from Fig. 7 by calculating the percentage improvement in EENS as a result of increasing the redundancy number in each case of NAN gateway availability. Both figures show that the explored availability level and redundancy number vary from 0.2 to 0.8 and from 1 to 4, respectively. At each explored redundancy number, the same number is applied on each area of the modified RTS. For example, when assessing the risk impact of adding one redundant NAN gateway, all five areas of the modified RTS have the same number of NAN gateways. Policy 2 of the DTR system is also applied here given its ability to provide the lowest risk level to the RTS. Given that this section examines the impact of the redundancy design in the communication system on RTS, the DTR system is considered fully reliable. Fig. 7 reveals that when the availability of the NAN gateway decreases from 0.8 to 0.2, the EENS value of the RTS significantly increases when similar redundancy numbers are compared. In other words, adding the same number of redundant gateways cannot mitigate the negative reliability impacts resulting from the reduction in gateway availability. Therefore, a higher number of redundancy is required to maintain or to reduce the EENS level when the availability of the NAN gateway is reduced, but this effect is limited and can be proven by examining Fig. 7 .
Across all availability levels presented in the figure, if the EENS level (685.09 MWhr/yr) achieved by the 0.8-availability gateway without any redundancy can be maintained/lowered, then only the 0.8-and 0.6-availability gateways with at least one redundancy can achieve such whilst the two other gateways with lower availability cannot suppress the increase in EENS irrespective of the added redundancy number. Apart from this comparison, there is no other situation where the addition of redundancy number allows the gateway with a lower availability obtain a smaller EENS value compared with the gateway with a higher availability. In other words, the prudent design of NAN gateways for improving their availability should take precedence over the redundancy consideration in communication system design. Therefore, when choosing between one very reliable NAN gateway or multiple redundant gateways with low availability, the former option should always be selected. Fig. 8 is examined to determine the worth of increasing gateway redundancy. This figure shows that the reduction in EENS, as expressed in percentage improvement, is almost directly proportional to the increment in gateway redundancy number. However, the cases of the two highest gateway availability benefit the most from this increment. As the redundancy number increases from 0 to 1, the EENS value improves the most by about 7.8% in the 0.8-availability gateway and by 6.5% in the 0.6-availability gateway. In the remaining two lower availability gateways, the EENS value shows insignificant improvements of only 1.1% and 0.5%. The result in Fig. 8 agrees with that in Fig. 7 such that adding redundancy to the NAN gateway with low availability cannot undo most of the negative risk impact on RTS.
As the redundancy number further increases from 1 to 2, only the 0.6-availability gateway manages to achieve a further EENS improvement of more than 5%. The 0.8-availability gateway does not benefits from this added redundancy and only manages to mildly improve the EENS by 0.4%. This finding can be ascribed to the fact that before increasing redundancy, the 0.8-availability gateway already has had its availability significantly increased to 0.96 after the previous addition of one redundancy. Given the already high availability, adding one more redundancy now has little impact and increases the availability further by only 3.3% to 0.992. The two-redundancy case then encounters only 3.3% less communication failures compared with the one-redundancy case. Together with the high weather estimation accuracy given by Policy 2, the abovementioned case further softens the failure impact and eventually results in an insignificant EENS improvement (0.4%). For the 0.6-availability gateway, its availability is only equal to 0.84 after the previous addition of one redundancy. Such availability further increases by 11.4% to 0.936 after the addition of the second redundancy. This improvement is much greater than the 3.3% improvement shown by the 0.8-availability gateway and therefore continues to provide a greater EENS reduction (>5%). Adding the second redundancy is also not beneficial to both the 0.4-and 0.2-availability gateways given that their improved final availability values are being downplayed by the low availability of their individual gateways and hence continue to be bogged down by high failure rates.
Across all gateway availability values, increasing the two redundancies to three and four further improves the EENS by only less than 1%. In the 0.8-and 0.6-availability gateways, such improvement results from the very high availabilities of these gateways and not much difference can be observed in the values before and after the addition of the third and fourth redundancies. In the 0.4-and 0.2-availability gateways, the final availability values remain low and continue to yield high failure rates and are therefore unable to improve the EENS significantly.
C. AREA EFFECTS
The results in section III.B highlight the relationship between NAN gateway redundancy and availability. However, the area on which the redundancy design should focus is not determined, that is, the sensitivity of each area towards the availability of the gateway remains unknown. To address this problem, the gateway in each area of the RTS is allowed to fail one at a time by using the 0.6-availability gateway and Policy 2 is used here. The 0.6-availability gateway is chosen given its active response to the redundancy effect highlighted in section III.B. Identifying the most vulnerable area based on this value will yield the greatest reliability benefit as the redundancy number increases in the identified area. Fig. 9 identifies areas E and D as the two areas with the highest sensitivity towards the loss of DTR capability. This finding can be ascribed to the fact that most load points are located in these two areas, thereby causing more power to be drawn towards these points. As a result, these areas require more line capacities and are more important than the other areas during the loss of line capacity. This result highlights that the EENS difference between areas D and E are only about 2% even if area E seems to be much more sensitive than area D as shown in Fig. 9 . Therefore, efforts to increase the availability of DTR capability, especially the communication system, should be equally allocated to both these areas. Areas A, B and C are less sensitive compared with areas D and E due to their stronger networks backed by multiple parallel paths. Therefore, the loss of the DTR capability has a lesser effect in these three areas. Amongst these areas, area C shows the least sensitivity and the lowest EENS due to its lack of load points.
IV. RESEARCH CHALLENGES
Several factors that must be considered by smart grid implementers are summarised as the following research challenges:
A. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF ADVANCE SENSOR INFRASTRUCTURE (ASI)
ASI is important in monitoring, sensing and collecting valuable information on the operating environment of power systems. This infrastructure also supports the two-way communication feature of power systems that enable a transition into smart grid networks. Consequently, the accuracy of the gathered information can directly affect the decisions of power system operators. A reliability analysis of ASI is therefore essential and should be considered in the modelling of communication network studies by every system operator. In this paper, the extent of influence of NAN gateway availability on the operation risk of the modified RTS is examined.
B. AVAILABILITY AND RISK ANALYSIS
The failure of any component of the communication network introduces a certain level of risk into the smart grid. This type of risk stems from information loss and leads to the suboptimal operation of a power system. This risk must be quantified and analysed to understand the worth of reducing its level by enhancing the communication network availability. In this paper, such risk is quantified as the EENS calculated by DCOPF, which in turn is taken as a function of the availability of DTR capability.
C. NETWORK REDUNDANCY DESIGN
Based on the current availability of the communication network, an appropriate redundancy design must be identified to optimise the reliability of the entire smart grid. Such redundancy can be explored to meet a certain risk or cost level. In some cases, adding redundancy cannot sufficiently mitigate the effect of the high failure probability of a poorly designed device. At the same time, adding redundancy may be the easiest and cheapest option. Given this complication, the relationship between redundancy and device availability must be explored. The effects of redundancy and availability on each other and on the risk level of the modified RTS are then examined in this paper.
D. FUTURE WORK
One important limitation of this paper is that a reliability study of smart grids under security attacks is not performed. The sensitive information of the grid transferred over the communication network can be mined, eavesdropped and altered for other ulterior motives, eventually leading to denial of service for the DTR system. Future smart grid models must consider these threats to achieve optimal protection and reliability. Natural disaster is another type of attack that, despite its rare occurrence, can deal widespread and costly damage. Based on previous records of cyberattacks and natural disasters, future risk models and the necessary mitigation actions must be combined with the probabilistic models examined in this paper.
As another important direction for future work, highly advanced line rating estimation methods based on the availability of wireless communication components must be explored. Several techniques, including artificial intelligence, may be employed to predict the actual line ratings when the communication system is unavailable.
V. CONCLUSION
The DTR system is important in efficiently enhancing the ratings of existing transmission lines with minimal costs. The benefits of this system are also widespread and well known. However, previous studies on the DTR system have ignored the reliability of its communication network, especially the wireless communication system. A new reliability analysis framework that considers these components is proposed in this work for the first time. VOLUME 7, 2019 
